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ADMISSIBILITY OF NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION




[T]he pilot of the DC-3 reported smoke in the cockpit of
the aircraft shortly after 5 p.m. and requested radar direc-
tions to the nearest airports ....
Shortly thereafter, he reported that he was not able to
make it to those airports and was going to attempt an off-
airport (emergency) landing ....
The DC-3 clipped a power line .... and skidded through
[a] pasture, leaving a trail of flames before striking a grove
of trees ....
National Transportation Safety Board investigator
Tommy McFall of Fort Worth arrived at the crash site
shortly before midnight.1
TODAY, THE GENERAL public readily recognizes the
I role of the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) in air crash investigation. The shock that accom-
panies a major tragedy such as the crash of a commercial
airliner attracts significant public attention. Much of the
publicity following a disaster centers around determining
the cause of the crash. Instinctively, people wonder why
such a tragedy occurred and who was responsible. Con-
gress has charged the NTSB with the job of determining
I The Dallas Morning News, Jan. 1, 1986, at 14A, col. 1. The accident de-
scribed led to the death of singer Rick Nelson and members of his group. The
plane, owned by Nelson, was enroute to Dallas where the group was to perform at
a New Year's Eve celebration.
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the probable cause of airplane crashes.2
Most airplane crashes lead to litigation. Congress has
not defined the NTSB's role in that litigation nearly as
well as they have defined the NTSB's role in investigating
accidents. Congress originally required that the NTSB not
participate at all in civil disputes. 3 Judicial interpretation
soon got the NTSB involved, however. 4 That involve-
ment was then defined and limited through regulation. 5
The courts have recognized these regulations, but recent
decisions have raised new problems with the role of the
NTSB that demand attention.8
This comment begins with a review of the NTSB's
changing participation in civil litigation emanating from
aircraft accidents. Part I outlines early legislation gov-
erning aviation accident investigation. Part II looks at the
early case law involving accident reports and testimony of
investigators. Part III examines the legislative response
to these decisions. Part IV highlights some of the current
problems that exist in using the results of NTSB investiga-
tions as evidence at trial. Finally, Part V contains recom-
mendations on how the NTSB's role can be improved in
light of conflicting interests.
I. EARLY LEGISLATION7
Since its initial regulation of air travel, Congress has as-
signed a governmental body the responsibility of deter-
mining and reporting the cause of accidents. The first
legislation governing civil aviation in the United States
was the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (the Act)." The Act
See infra note 26 and accompanying text for discussion.
See infra note 27 and accompanying text for discussion.
4 See infra notes 57 and 104 and accompanying text for discussion.
See infra notes 105-144 and accompanying text for discussion.
See infra notes 145-191 and accompanying text for discussion.
See generally Miller, Aviation Accident Investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives,
46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 237, 237-54 (1981) (thorough history of air accident
investigation legislation). During his career, Mr. Miller served as the Director of
the Bureau of Aviation Safety of the NTSB.
" Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) [hereinafter the Act].
called for the Secretary of Air Commerce (the Secretary)
to "investigate, record and make public the causes of acci-
dents in civil air navigation." 9
In 1934, as the air travel industry began to grow, Con-
gress amended the Act to enable the Secretary to improve
accident investigation.' 0 The amendment empowered the
Secretary to hold hearings and subpoena witnesses and
documents." The amendment also prohibited using the
Secretary's report in litigation arising from the accident
investigated.1 2  This same prohibition exists today,
although, as this comment explains, it has experienced an
interesting metamorphosis since its inception in 1934.
In 1937 the Secretary adopted administrative regula-
tions which created the first accident investigation
panel. -3 The panel consisted of three employees of the
Department of Commerce and two non-employees who
acted as advisors.14 Over the thirty years that followed,
this panel evolved into the current NTSB.
The death of a colleague in 1935 jolted Congress into
action. Senator Bronson M. Cutting was killed when the
plane in which he was a passenger crashed enroute from
New Mexico, his home state, to Kansas.' 5 As a direct re-
sult of the accident, Congress eventually passed the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 (the 1938 Act).' 6 The 1938 Act
created the Civil Aeronautics Authority and consolidated
all government involvement in aviation within one
agency.I7 One of three departments within the Civil Aer-
onautics Authority was the Air Safety Board.' Congress
created the board to determine the cause of accidents and
recommend ways to avoid similar accidents from occur-
Pub. L. No. 73-418, 48 Stat. 1113 (1934).
Id. § 2(e).
r Id.
14 C.F.R. § 91.0-.37 (1939).
1 Miller, supra note 7, at 239.
us Id.
, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938)(hereinafter the 1938 Act].
17 Id.
' Miller, supra note 7, at 240.
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ring.'9 Unfortunately, organizational problems abounded
under the 1938 Act, and Congress soon passed new provi-
sions in an attempt to cure the problems through reorga-
nizing the agency.2 °
In 1940, Congress created a separate agency, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB). 2 ' The CAB coexisted with the
Civil Aeronautics Authority until passage of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 (the 1958 Act).22 During this period
of time, accident investigation responsibilities rested with
the Bureau of Safety.23
The 1958 Act created the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) and redefined the responsibilities of the
CAB.24  The CAB took over accident investigation re-
sponsibility which included determining probable cause.25
Congress mandated that the CAB conduct thorough in-
vestigations of the people and machines involved in air
accidents and recommend changes that would help pro-
'- Id. The role of the Air Safety Board was to "investigate accidents and make
determinations of probable cause, release its findings to the public, recommend
measures to prevent accidents, and make the rules necessary to fulfill all of these
functions." Id
20 See id. at 240-4 1. Miller quoted a Commerce Department memorandum con-
cerning the disorganization as stating:
The chief weakness of our present accident investigation lies in the
fact that the investigatory body has no power to change any safety
rules. All it can do is to report the probable cause of the accident to
the rule-making body and make recommendations for changes in the
safety rules designed to prevent similar accidents in the future. The
rule-making body, the (Civil Aeronautics] Authority, may accept or
reject such recommendations.
Id. at 241 (quoting Memorandum from Undersecretary of Commerce E. J. Noble
to Secretary Hopkins in support of the Aviation Provisions of Reorganization
Plans Ill and IV (April 23, 1940)).
21 Miller, supra note 7, at 241.
- Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) [hereinafter the 1958 Act].
2-3 Miller, supra note 7, at 242-43.
24 The 1958 Act, see supra note 22.
us Miller, supra note 7, at 244. The legislation separated the fact finding, done
by the FAA, from determining the probable cause, done by the CAB, so that the
agencies avoided the appearance of protecting each other. Federal Aviation Act:
Hearings on H.R. 12616 Before Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1958) (statement of Gen. E. R. Quesada, Chair-
man, Airways Modernization Board).
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hibit similar incidents from recurring.26 The CAB re-
ceived a clear edict: prevent future accidents by finding
the cause of those that do occur.
Section 701(e) of the 1958 Act unequivocally set forth
the role that CAB reports were to play in civil litigation.
That section stated that litigants could not attempt to ad-
mit CAB reports into evidence in any suit arising out of
any accident mentioned in the report.27 Congress' intent
in including section 701(e) was not clear. The section ac-
tually began as an amendment to the 1938 Act.28 As
noted in 1950 by John W. Simpson, an attorney with the
Bureau of Law, Civil Aeronautics Board, "The exact
scope and purpose of [the amendment] are at the present
time the subject of great uncertainty .... ",29 Little legisla-
tive history accompanied passage of this section.30 Appar-
ently though, Congress wanted to insure that CAB
reports would not supplant the role of judge and jury in
2 Miller, supra note 7, at 244. The 1958 Act required the CAB
to make recommendations to the FAA Administrator that, in its
opinion, would tend to prevent similar accidents in the future; to
conduct special studies pertaining to the prevention of accidents;
and to preserve and otherwise examine aircraft parts and property
involved in an accident and, in the case of fatal accidents, to have
autopsies conducted.
•t7 The 1958 Act, supra note 22, § 701(e) (codified in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e)
(1982)). The Section reads:
No part of any report or reports of ..the Civil Aeronautics Board
relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall be admit-
ted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing
out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.
'd The 1938 Act, seesupra note 16, § 701(e); see also Simpson, Use ofAircraftAcci.
dent Investigation in Actions for Damages, 17J. AnR L. & COM. 283 (1950).
"- Simpson, supra note 28, at 283.
- See id. at 284 n.3.
The only legislative history on this section is a statement by Mr.
Henry AllenJohnston of the Committee on Aeronautics, Association
of the Bar, New York, N.Y., to the effect that accident investigation
records could not be used for any purpose in any litigation. Since
there is no evidence that Congress, or even the Subcommittee, did
or did not agree with his statement, it would seem to have little or no
probative value in determining the intent of Congress.
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determining the cause of accidents and encourage accu-
rate and unencumbered investigation by keeping the CAB
separated from liability determination."1 The CAB
adopted regulations proscribing investigators from testi-
fying so as to avoid having the reports brought into litiga-
tion through expert testimony. With no clear
congressional intent, the judiciary freely lent its interpre-
tation to the seemingly plain language of section 701(e).
II. EARLY CASE LAW3 2
As the aviation industry grew and prospered, the
number of accidents increased, as did the number of
deaths and injuries resulting from each accident. Large
scale law suits ensued and attorneys naturally sought to
use CAB reports when they supported their claim or de-
fense. Beginning in 195 1, the courts attacked the prohibi-
tion set forth in section 701(e). The first case in a series
that spanned twenty years was Universal Airline, Inc. v. East-
ern Air Lines, Inc. 33
A. Universal Airline, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
In 1951, Universal Airline appealed the district court
decision in a suit arising from a mid-air collision between
a Universal DC-3 and an Eastern DC-4.3 4 Universal Air-
line sued Eastern for damages, alleging that the negli-
- I L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENr LAW § 18.01[2] (1971).
12 For a discussion of these cases see Dombroff & Hatfield, Documentation for
Aircraft Accident Litigation, TRIAL, Aug. 1984, at 70, 71; Papadakis, Admissibility of
Aircraft Accident Reports: An Update, 18 S. TEx. LJ. 519, 521 (1977); Sales, Discovery
Problems in Aviation Litigation, 38 J. AIR L. & CoM. 297, 315-19 (1972); Welch &
Faulk, The Use of Aviation Accident Reports By Civil Litigants: The Historical Development
of 49 U.S.C. [sic app.] Section 1441(e), 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 583, 586-91 (1982).
" 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
Id. at 995-96. The two planes involved were both headed from Newark, New
Jersey to Miami, Florida. The Universal plane took off fifteen minutes before the
Eastern plane, but travelled fifty miles per hour slower. Each plane received in-
structions to follow the same flight path at the same altitude. Air traffic control
informed the Eastern aircraft pilot of the Universal aircraft's presence. The colli-
sion occurred as the Eastern plane overtook the Universal plane. Eastern claimed
that the Universal plane was off course. Id.
[53
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gence of Eastern's pilots caused the accident.3 5 The
district court entered judgment on a verdict against Uni-
versal and in favor of Eastern on its counterclaim.3 6
Among other claims of error on appeal, Universal pled it
was error to require testimony from the CAB investigator
assigned to the accident and to compel disclosure of the
CAB report.3 7 The CAB supported Universal's position
on these points and filed a brief on its behalf.3 8
The CAB stated in its brief that section 701(e) pre-
cluded all testimony from investigators of the accident
giving rise to the litigation .3  The CAB gave five reasons
for this policy: the CAB's congressional mandate to inves-
tigate accidents for the purpose of preventing future acci-
dents; the belief that witnesses would not disclose facts
completely and honestly without a guarantee of confiden-
tiality; the fact that an individual investigator's opinions
might differ from the ultimate CAB opinions as to the ac-
cident's cause; the influence that investigators might have
on determining the civil liabilities of parties involved in
the accident; and the drain on CAB resources that would
result if investigators spent their time testifying in civil
damage suits. 40 The court found the reasoning sound but
5 Id at 996.
3c Id. at 995.
-7 Id. at 997, 1000.
3a Id. at 997. The CAB stated in their brief that the decision of the court con-
cerning the issues presented "would establish a precedent, not only of interest to
it, but of great importance to the public." Id.
st Id at 997-98.
40 Id. at 998. The court summarized the CAB's policy reasons for precluding
all testimony from investigators as follows:
(1) the obviously correct concept that the [CAB] had been in-
structed by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents solely for the
purpose of gaining the information necessary to prevent the recur-
rence of similar accidents, and not for the purpose of securing evi-
dence or providing witnesses for the benefit of parties to private
litigation,
(2) the belief that the refusal to release information encouraged
frank disclosures on the part of the persons involved and that such
disclosures were in the public interest,
(3) the obvious undesirability of releasing a particular investigator's
conclusion which might differ from the subsequent final determina-
tion by the [CAB] of the cause of the accident,
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stated that the parties must view the 1938 Act in light of
the "governmental function of administering justice, the
judicial power, and the established practice and prece-
dents of our system of jurisprudence.' '41
The court held that it was not error to compel the testi-
mony of the investigator in this case. 42 The CAB regula-
tions contained provisions for deposing investigators as
to the facts surrounding the accident. The court found
this significant because the CAB admitted in their brief
that the nature of accident investigation meant the investi-
gators were the only people privy to certain information
following the accident. 43 For example, only the investiga-
tors may view the wreckage and remove parts for labora-
tory analysis." The court stated that when deposition
testimony was unavailable or insufficient, a judge could
compel the investigator to testify at trial.45 The opinion
did not specify whether judges should restrict the testi-
mony to facts or the testimony could include the investi-
gator's own opinions as to the cause of the accident as
well.
The court did find it was error to force the CAB to pro-
duce the report of the accident or to compel testimony on
ultimate findings given in the report because it contained
"hearsay based upon hearsay" in the form of statements
taken by investigators from witnesses at the scene and
(4) the fact that the conclusions of its investigators often subse-
quently embodied in the (CAB's] reports would, as a practical mat-
ter, influence the determination of the civil liabilities of the parties
involved if testified to in damage suits, contrary to the plain purpose
and intent if not the letter of section 701(e) of the [1938] Act [as
amended], and
(5) the number of accidents involving aircraft was such as to require
the full time of its experts in investigating them and the public inter-
est dictated that the time of these experts not be consumed by ap-
pearance in courts to give testimony in private damage suits.
41 Id.
42 Id at 999-1000.
-4 Id at 999.
44 Id.
I4 d. at 1000.
from recordings of CAB conducted hearings.4 6 The court
held the testimony and report evidence inadmissible be-
cause it would "tend to usurp the function of the jury. ' 47
The decision made a definite inroad into use of evi-
dence obtained through CAB investigations. While liti-
gants could not admit reports into evidence, judges could
compel investigators to testify. In Universal Airline, at
least, the interests of the private litigants outweighed the
concerns put forth by the CAB.
B. Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc.48
Eight months after the Universal Airline decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Lobel v.
American Airlines, Inc. and completely changed the role ac-
cident reports would play in litigation. In a classic exam-
ple of judicial activism, the Second Circuit ignored the
language of section 701 (e) and decided Lobel on the basis
of the limited legislative history regarding the section.49
Mr. Lobel, a passenger on an American Airlines flight
that crashed, sued to recover for his injuries.50 The jury
returned a verdict in the plaintiff's favor and American
appealed.5' At the trial, the court admitted into evidence
the CAB report filed by the accident investigator. 52 Amer-
ican claimed that the court erred by admitting the report
because it contained the investigator's observations about
the plane wreckage.53 The district court judge clearly
contravened section 701(e) by admitting the report.
,, Id. The court stated, "the conclusions or opinions of the administrative
agencies or boards or any testimony reflecting directly or indirectly the ultimate
views or findings of the agency or board are generally held inadmissible .. " Id.
47 Id.
" 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951).
4o Id. at 220. The limited legislative history provided that Congress intended
section 701 (e) to prevent usurping the jury's function by introducing the facts and
cause as found by the CAB investigators. See supra note 31 and accompanying
text.
- Lobel, 192 F.2d at 218-19. The plane crashed "because the engines stopped
functioning properly." Ia' at 219.
5 Id. at 219.
- d at 220.
- Idt
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The court of appeals cited Universal Airline as standing
for the proposition that section 701(e) prevented intro-
duction of only the CAB finding as to probable cause.
5 4
In actuality, Universal Airline stated simply that CAB re-
ports were not admissible, with no reference to whether
the report contained any opinion as to probable cause. 5
The court reviewed the report and found that it contained
only observations, with "no opinions or conclusions
about possible causes of the accident or defendant's negli-
gence." 56 Apparently, the Lobel court felt that none of the
reasons for excluding reports given in Universal Airline ap-
plied to this particular report. The court admitted the re-
port because the content of the report was within the
scope of questions which the attorneys could have asked
the investigator at deposition.
The Lobel decision opened the door for litigants to offer
CAB reports into evidence, with the court bearing the
burden of determining whether the report contained con-
clusions as to probable cause. Six years later, in a strange
twist, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit actually
used conclusions contained in a report to decide liability
in a case.
C. Israel v. United States5
In 1957, the Second Circuit essentially rendered section
701(e) meaningless, albeit in a specific factual setting. In
Israel the court admitted the report of the CAB into evi-
dence. 59 The report clearly contained statements con-
' d.
" See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Universal
Airline holding.
- Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220.
.5 Id
- 247 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1957).
• Id. at 429. Israel piloted a private plane that crashed at an emergency airfield
maintained by the United States. Israel landed at the field to purchase fuel and
crashed attempting to take-off. Id. at 427. He alleged that the grass was too tall
and that there were holes in the runway which kept him from acquiring sufficient
speed to get off the ground. Id. at 428. The government claimed he was unfamil-
COMMENTS
cerning the probable cause of the accident. °
In a footnote, the court stated that the report included
inadmissible conclusions as to probable causes of the acci-
dent.61 The court held that the government failed to ob-
ject to admitting the evidence at trial, however, and could
not raise admissibility of the evidence as error on appeal.
The holding ignored the fact that the evidence was statu-
torily barred.62 Based on the trial evidence, including the
report, the court reversed the lower court's finding of
fault.63
D. Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc."
In 1963, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
took another step away from the absolute prohibition on
use of reports contained in section 701 (e) (cited as section
1441(e) after codification of the 1958 Act). Berguido, a
wrongful death suit, resulted from the crash of an Eastern
flight that no one survived.65 The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff and Eastern appealed. 6
At trial, counsel for Berguido introduced the deposi-
tions of the lead investigators of the accident.67 Through
the depositions, Berguido succeeded in exposing the jury
iar with the plane and applied the brakes while traveling down the runway. Id. at
429 n.1
- Id. at 429. The court quoted from the report: "[Tihe field is also rough and
would tend to cause an aircraft to bounce on the take-off run and lose lift." Id.
at Id. at 429 n.2. "It would seem that those statements of the investigator (Wil-
son) in the CAB accident report that contained references to probable causes of
the accident were inadmissible as evidence in this litigation .... This provision
[section 701(e)] has been construed rather narrowly, however." hi.
Id. at 429.
SId. at 430-31.
- 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
.. Id. at 630. The plane attempted to land in poor weather conditions at Ime-
son Airport in Jacksonville, Florida. Evidence showed that the plane came in at
excessive speed below authorized minimum altitude. Investigators hypothesized
that the crew, attempting to land before the tower closed the airport due to poor
visibility, tried to get below the cloud cover in order to see the runway. The plane
crashed approximately three quarters of a mile from the end of the runway in a
wooded area. Id at 629-30.
- Id. at 630.
,7 Id. at 631.
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to contents of the CAB report.8 On appeal, Eastern
urged that section 1441(e) and Lobel, in which the court
only admitted testimony as to observations of the investi-
gator, precluded this use of the deposition.6 9 The facts
submitted through the depositions were calculations not
made by the deponent and, thus, not the deponent's ob-
servations.7 0 The court held that Eastern did not properly
interpret section 1441(e) or Lobel, stating that section
1441 (e) seemingly struck a balance between the desires of
the CAB to encourage complete and honest disclosure
from parties involved and the desires of civil litigants to
have access to all accident information. 71  The court
found the testimony admissible under 1441(e) because it
did not include the ultimate probable cause
determination."
The court went on to find the testimony inadmissible
on hearsay grounds. 73 The calculations involved assump-
tions that the judges felt opposing counsel should have
available for challenge through cross-examination.74 The
Federal Rules of Evidence later altered this aspect of the
decision.75  The decision has had a lasting effect. Other
courts have followed Berguido and admitted the factual
- Id. Counsel exposed the jury to the aircraft's angle and rate of descent. lId
GOId
70 Id An investigator determined the angle and rate of descent through calcu-
lations based in part on the damage done to the trees and the marks on the
ground where the plane crashed. Id
7 Id. at 631-32.
The fundamental policy underlying 1441 (e) appears to be a compro-
mise between the interests of those who would adopt a policy of ab-
solute privilege in order to secure full and frank disclosure as to the
probable cause and thus help prevent future accidents and the coun-
tervailing policy of making available all accident information to liti-
gants in a civil suit.
Id. Neither Congress nor the CAB had previously indicated any intent to balance
competing interests. See supra notes 11-31 describing the history of section
1441(e). The only hint of compromise is in Congress allowing litigants to use
testimony of investigators taken at depositions. See Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220.
72 Berguido, 317 F.2d at 632.
3 Id,
74Id.
. See infra notes 135-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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content of accident investigation reports through testi-
mony even when the person testifying did not observe the
facts admitted.
E. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Frank76
The search for a definitive rule on admitting parts of
CAB reports did not end with the decision in Berguido,
however. The confusion that existed is best exemplified
by the way the district court in Connecticut handled the
Frank case. The court decided the admissibility issue in
1963, and then again in 1964. 7
The plaintiffs in the Frank case sought to introduce acci-
dent reports completed by various sub-committees of the
CAB. 8 They claimed that section 1441 (e) barred only the
report of the CAB and not the sub-committee reports. 79
The court held that any report could be admitted as long
as the conclusion or opinions offered did not "lie within
or close to the ambit of the ultimate question in the
case."
80
The following year, the court rendered a supplemental
decision. 8 ' Relying on Israel and Berguido, the court al-
tered the test for admissibility.8 2 "A more workable and
better rule is entirely to exclude all evaluation, opinion
and conclusion evidence."83 The court then outlined
what it might admit as fact and what it would strike as
opinion by taking examples directly from the actual CAB
70 214 F. Supp. 803 (D. Conn. 1963), modified sub nom. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
New York v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn.
1964).
77 Id.
78 214 F. Supp. at 805. The suit involved the insurer of a passenger killed in a
plane crash and the passenger's beneficiary. Id
"Id. The CAB report is a compilation of the reports of subcommittees as-
signed to investigate each aspect of the crash. Id.
d
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California,
227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964).




482 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
reports the plaintiff offered.8 4
F. American Airlines, Inc. v. United States85
After the Frank decision, the test for admissibility
seemed well delineated. However, confusion persisted as
other courts declined to follow the Connecticut district
court's lead and the test continued to change. In 1969,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit specifically took
exception to the Frank test.
American Airlines appealed a district court decision
finding that neither the Weather Bureau nor the air traffic
controller acted negligently in handling a flight that
ended in tragedy.88 On appeal, American challenged the
government's introduction of two exhibits. 87 The govern-
ment introduced a graph showing the altitude of the air-
craft that crashed and an explanation of the flight
recorder read-out.88 American contended that the docu-
ments contained opinions of the investigators who pre-
pared the documents.8 9 The court described the test as
- Id at 949-50. As an example, the court found the following parts of the re-
port to be objectionable as "evaluation, opinion or conclusion evidence":
Page 14: "A survey of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft had
broken up in the air and had fallen to the ground in several large
pieces. The forward section of the fuselage had broken free of the
remaining portion of the fuselage at a point just aft of the lavatory
section and fell to the ground right-side up with little forward mo-
tion." Page 14: "The cockpit section of the aircraft suffered extreme
impact damage."
Page 16: There might be deleted from the last paragraph of § 2 as
conclusory the words, "The time of the accident was taken from..."
and "Inspection revealed that the clock had stopped on impact and
offers the most reliable time for the occurrence of the accident"
leaving as factual the words "the captain's instrument panel clock...
was found in the cockpit section of the wreckage broken free of its
mount on the panel."
Id.
", 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
IC d. at 183. The American Airlines Boeing 727 crashed on approach to
Greater Cincinnati Airport in a thunderstorm. The crash killed fifty-eight of the
sixty-two people aboard. Id.
I0 d. at 196.
" Id. The evidence indicated that the pilot, who was being tested for an up-
graded classification, failed to follow the missed approach procedures. Id.
-" Id.
not whether the reports contained any opinions, but
rather whether the reports contained "official agency
opinion." 90 The court then stated, "Because of the uncer-
tainty which the Frank rule would introduce in sorting fact
from opinion, it would be better to exclude opinion testi-
mony only when it embraces the probable cause of the
accident or the negligence of the defendant." 91 Thus, the
Frank test did not live long and the probable cause test
put forth in Berguido seemed to return to favor.
G. Falk v. United States92
The same court that decided Frank in 1963 and 1964
decided Falk in 1971. The issue in Falk was whether the
plaintiff, during a deposition, could compel the chief in-
vestigator from the CAB to give his opinion as to the
cause of the accident. The court found it significant that
the investigator worked for the defendant, the United
States.94 The court held that it should treat the United
States like any other litigant and, because "taking of opin-
ion testimony in pre-trial depositions is a judicially sanc-
tioned practice," the investigator must cooperate. 95 The
court stated that the defendant could object to the testi-
mony if the plaintiff attempted to admit it at trial.96 How-
ever, the decision meant parties could at least obtain an
investigator's testimony as to probable cause, and then
take their chances with the trial court.
H. Kline v. Martin 97
In 1972, a Virginia district court qualified the Falk deci-
- I& In stating the test, the court relied on Berguido. IM.
3 I. The court stated that deriving the facts reported required complex evalu-
ation. The factual inquiry into the aircraft's "altitude, speed, heading, and vertical
acceleration" necessarily contained some opinion. M.
53 F.R.D. 113 (D. Conn. 1971).
1I3 d. at 114.
Id. at 115.
I5 Id. The court also relied on 49 U.S.C. app. § 1654(e) (1982), which made the
reports public documents and open to inspection. Id. at 114-15.
I& at 115.
07 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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sion somewhat. Kline presented a situation nearly identi-
cal to that in Falk. The crash investigators refused to
testify at deposition to any matters involving opinion.98
The court held that by refusing to testify the investigators
"cut off the primary avenue to the truth."99 Relying on
the decision in American Airlines, which called for excluding
opinion testimony only when it pertained to the probable
cause of the accident,100 the court required the investiga-
tors "to testify even if it involve[d] their opinions, so long
as the opinion [was] not as to the ultimate conclusion of
cause of the accident." 10' While the Kline decision did
limit the complete freedom to depose the investigator af-
forded the plaintiff in Falk, the defendant in Kline was not
the government as it was in Falk.10 2
By 1972, the courts lifted the blanket prohibition on us-
ing accident reports at trial. Courts, relying on
Berguido,10 3 held that only that part of the report contain-
ing the probable cause of the accident was objectiona-
ble. 10 4  After Kline and Falk, litigants could compel
investigators to testify at depositions to at least some
opinion, if not opinion as to the probable cause. The
changes that occurred regarding the use of accident re-
ports and investigator opinion combined with the confu-
sion existing between courts meant the time had come for
legislative and regulatory response. That time arrived
shortly after the Virginia district court rendered the Kline
decision.
- Id. at 32. The suit involved a passenger in an airplane that crashed in a re-
mote area of Alaska whose decedents filed a wrongful death action. l
- Id. at 33.
sou Id. at 32; see supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
American Airlines case.
1- Kline, 345 F. Supp. at 33.
102 See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Falk
decision.
103 See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Berguido
case.
304 See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of two deci-
sions finding objectionable only the part of a report containing the probable
cause.
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III. LEGISLATIVE AND AGENCY RESPONSE TO THE
JUDICIARY
A. Statutory Changes
As the airline industry continued to grow, Congress
continued to reorganize the regulatory agencies responsi-
ble for control of aviation. The NTSB actually came into
existence in 1966 through the Department of Transporta-
tion Act of 1966.105 The Bureau of Safety, formerly under
the CAB, became the Bureau of Aviation Safety under the
NTSB.10 6 However, these changes had little substantive
effect on the accident investigation function.'07
The last substantive change in accident investigation
came in 1974 with the Independent Safety Board Act of
1974 (the 1974 Act).10 8 This Act made the NTSB an in-
dependent agency as of April 1, 1975.109 Congress in-
tended the 1974 Act to separate the NTSB from the FAA
and the Department of Transportation. °" 0 Under the old
organizational scheme the NTSB often ultimately investi-
gated its sister, the FAA. To avoid conflict, Congress split
the agencies, removing all constraints from thorough and
accurate accident investigation."'
The 1974 Act maintained much of the accident investi-
gation procedures and policies of the earlier acts. Section
1441(a) of the 1974 Act defined the responsibilities of the
NTSB as: regulating accident reporting; investigating ac-
cidents and filing a report of the facts and the probable
cause; recommending ways to prevent similar accidents;
allowing public access to reports; and conducting special
studies to improve air safety." 2 Section 1441(e) did not
change from the way it appeared in the early legisla-
105 Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 935 (1966).
- Id.; see also Miller, supra note 7, at 245-49 for a discussion of the events sur-
rounding the legislative changes.
107 Miller, supra note 7, at 246.
,on 49 U.S.C. app. § 1901 (1982) [hereinafter the 1974 Act].
too Id. § 1902.
'to Miller, supra note 7, at 247-48.
oi Id. at 248.
,'2 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(a) (1982). The section reads:
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tion: 113 "No part of any report or reports of the National
Transportation Safety Board relating to any accident or
the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or
used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any
matter mentioned in such report or reports." 11 4 The sub-
stantive changes came in the redesignation and revision of
the regulations.
B. Regulation Changes
The regulations of the NTSB became part of Title 49 of
the Code of Federal Regulations. 15 The Federal Register
contains an explanation of the revisions."t 6 In the most
significant change, the NTSB revised Part 835 pertaining
to testimony of NTSB employees."t 7 The part sets the
policies and procedures for employee testimony." 8 Sec-
tion 835.2 makes the first regulatory distinction between
reports containing purely factual findings and reports
containing the NTSB's probable cause determination' 9
(1) Make rules and regulations governing notification and report of
accidents involving civil aircraft;
(2) Investigate such accidents and report the facts, conditions, and
circumstances relating to each accident and the probable cause
thereof;
(3) Make such recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation
as, in its opinion, will tend to prevent similar accidents in the future;
(4) Make such reports public in such form and manner as may be
deemed by it to be in the public interest; and
(5) Ascertain what will best tend to reduce or eliminate the possibil-
ity of, or recurrence of, accidents by conducting special studies and
investigations on matters pertaining to safety in air navigation and
the prevention of accidents.
Id.
", See supra notes 10-20 for a discussion of the early legislation.
"4 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1982).
49 C.F.R. §§ 800-845 (1986).
... 40 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (1975).
49 C.F.R. § 835 (1986).
49 C.F.R. § 835.1 (1986). "This part prescribes the policies and procedures
regarding the testimony of employees of the National Transportation Safety
Board in suits or actions for damages and criminal proceedings arising out of
transportation accidents." Id.
49 C.F.R. § 835.2 (1986). The definition section of the part reads:
(a) "The [NTS4's] accident report" means the report containing
the [NTSB's] determinations, including the probable cause of an ac-
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This section confirms that litigants in civil cases cannot
use the report containing probable cause determina-
tion.1 20 The part also specifies that an NTSB employee
can only use the factual report as an aid while testifying.1 21
All testimony is similarly restricted to facts obtained by
the employee during investigation. 22 The regulation spe-
cifically instructs investigators to refuse to testify as to any
opinions about the cause of accidents investigated.1 23
cident, issued either as a narrative report or in a computer for-
mat.... (N]o part of these reports may be admitted as evidence or
used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter
mentioned in such reports. (b) "Factual accident report" means an
investigator's report of his investigation of the accident. (c) "Acci-
dent" for purposes of this part, includes "incident."
120 I
121 Id § 835.4. This seciion reads:
(a) A[n NTSB] employee may use a copy of his factual accident re-
port as a testimonial aid, and may refer to that report during his
testimony or use it to refresh his memory.
(b) Consistent with section 701(e) of the [1958] Act.... a[n NTSB]
employee may not use the [NTSB's] accident report for any purpose
during his testimony.
122 Id § 835.3. This section reads:
(a) Section 70 1(e) of the [1958] Act ... preclude[s] the use or ad-
mission into evidence of [NTSB] accident reports in any suit or ac-
tion for damages arising from accidents. The purpose of th[is]
section would be defeated if expert opinion testimony of (NTSB]
employees, which is reflected in the ultimate views of the [NTSB]
expressed in its report concerning the cause of an accident, were
admitted in evidence or used in private litigation arising out of an
accident. The [NTSB] relies heavily upon its investigators' opinions
in determining the cause or probable cause of an accident, and the
investigators' opinions thus become inextricably entwined in the
[NTSB's] determination. Furthermore, the use of [NTSB] employ-
ees as experts to give opinion testimony would impose a serious ad-
ministrative burden on the ... investigative staff. Litigants should
obtain their expert witnesses from other sources.
(b) Consistent with paragraph (a) of this section, [NTSB] employees
may testify as to the factual information they obtained during the
course of the accident investigation, including factual evaluations
embodied in their factual accident reports. However, they shall de-
dine to testify regarding matters beyond the scope of their investiga-
tion, or to give opinion testimony concerning the cause of the
accident.
d123 Id
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The changes resulted directly from the decisions in
Kline and Falk. 24 In its discussion of the changes, the
NTSB stated, "The only opinions proscribed are those
which reflect the ultimate determination of cause or prob-
able cause determined by the [NTSB] and expressed in
the [NTSB's] reports."'' 25 This language coincides with
the Kline decision, but falls short of the rule put forth in
Falk.126 The NTSB, in prohibiting investigators from tes-
tifying to anything but their factual observations, stated
that the Falk decision was "clearly in error. "127
The distinction in the Kline decision 28 and the defini-
tion section of the new regulation 29 between factual re-
port content and probable cause reflected procedural
changes made at the NTSB. As the complexity and scope
of accident investigations grew, the NTSB began prepar-
ing two distinct reports. The NTSB continues this prac-
tice today. The first report, entitled the Factual Aircraft
Accident Report and prepared by the accident investiga-
tor, does not actually contain a probable cause determina-
tion. 30 Litigants can easily obtain this report from the
124 40 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (1975). The NTSB stated that it "considers its revised
policy to be consistent with existing law, relying in particular on Kline . . .
[alithough it may appear to be inconsistent with Falk. .. wherein an investigator
was required to express an opinion as to the cause of an accident .. " Id.
125 Id. The NTSB stated that "Although [it] continues its prohibition against
[NTSB] employees acting as expert witnesses in litigation, the previous limitation
of such testimony to factual information has been relaxed." Id.
126 See supra notes 92-104 for a discussion of the Kline and Falk decisions.
127 40 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (1975). "[Ihe rationale for [the Falk] decision was
clearly in error and any doubt thereon has been removed .... The [NTSB]
continues its prohibition against the requirement that investigators should testify
on matters beyond the scope of their investigation." Id.
12R See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text concerning the Kline case.
"- See supra note 119 for the text of the definition section of the regulations.
130 Papadakis, supra note 32, at 520-21. This article lists the contents of the
Factual Aircraft Accident Reports as:
(1) a[n] NTSB form #6120.1 filled out by the accident investigator
at the scene of the accident;
(2) a form #04-R5-5 filled out and submitted by the
owner/operator of the aircraft;
(3) an investigators [sic] narrative report written by the investigator
after all factual material has been compiled;
(4) a flight planning package supplied by the FAA with whom the
flight plan was filed;
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NTSB in Washington D.C.'51 The Factual Aircraft Acci-
dent Report falls outside the scope of the "NTSB's re-
port" for purposes of the prohibition contained in section
1441(e). 132 The other report, the "NTSB's report" or
"blue cover" report, contains the NTSB's determination
as to the probable cause of the accident.' 3 By keeping
these reports separate, the NTSB can more easily uphold
its own policies regarding the use of the reports.
C. The Federal Rules of Evidence
During 1975, a second statutory change occurred that
ultimately impacts on the use of NTSB reports in litiga-
tion. On July 1, 1975, new Federal Rules of Evidence
took effect, three of which pertain to NTSB investigations
and reports.1 3 4
The first, Rule 803(8), provides a hearsay exception for
public records and reports.3 5 This provision allows liti-
(5) a flight following package usually in the form of radio transmis-
sions, transcripts provided by the FAA;
(6) a meteorological survey showing the existing and forecast
weather and weather warning provided by the U.S. Weather Service
in the region of the path of flight and accident;
(7) malfunction or failure reports of instruments or component re-
ports [sic]. These reports are requested when merited by the inves-
tigator from either the NTSB technical laboratories or local FAA
approved maintenance shops;
(8) photographs usually taken by the investigator in charge;
(9) wreckage distribution map usually drawn by the investigator in
charge;
(10) written witness statements usually requested by the investiga-
tor in charge.
" See Dombroff & Hatfield, supra note 32, at 70. This article is an excellent
practical guide to obtaining accident reports. Included are descriptions of useful
documents and addresses of the offices to write to obtain the documents.
1:.2 See supra note 119 for the text of the definition section of the regulations.
3. Papadakis, supra note 32, at 523; see also Miller, supra note 7, at 280-81 (iden-
tifying the two reports).
Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Star. 1926.
FED. R. EviD. 803(8). The rule reads:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or
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gants in civil disputes to admit factual reports of investiga-
tions made pursuant to law, clearly encompassing Factual
Aircraft Accident Reports, but not the "NTSB reports,"
which are not strictly factual.136 According to the advisory
committee's notes, the drafters envisioned that admissible
reports could include hearing testimony.1 3 7  This rule
removes the "hearsay based upon hearsay" concern iden-
tified in Universal Airline. 38 The provision does contain an
escape clause if the report appears untrustworthy.1 39
The other significant pronouncements are Rules 703
and 704.140 Rule 703 allows a testifying expert to base his
opinion on any facts usually relied upon by similar ex-
perts.1 4 ' Counsel may call any accident investigation ex-
pert to testify as to opinions of an accident's cause. The
data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting
forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters ob-
served pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or
(C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of informa-
tion or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id.
136 See id.; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 816 (4th Cir. 1982)
(rule 803(8) considered but not relied on to exclude NTSB reports). But see John
McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1977) (NTSB
reports held inadmissible under Rule 803(8) because they contain statements of
people other than the government officials).
i' FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note. In their discussion of the
admissibility of evaluative reports, the advisory committee wrote: "Factors which
may be of assistance in passing upon the admissibility of evaluative reports in-
clude: (1) the timeliness of the investigation... ; (2) the special skill or experience
of the official. . .; (3) whether a hearing was held and the level at which con-
ducted...; (4) possible motivation problems .... " Id
," See supra note 46 and accompanying text discussing the Universal case.
"' See supra note 135 for the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8).
,ao FED. R. EVID. 703, 704.
" FED. R. EvID. 703. This rule reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known
to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
COMMENTS
expert would undoubtedly rely on the same facts that go
into the NTSB probable cause determination (quite possi-
bly by using the Factual Aircraft Accident Report and
even the probable cause determination). An NTSB inves-
tigator can also base testimony on any investigation
materials that go into the Factual Aircraft Accident Re-
port, but not the probable cause determination made by
the NTSB because of the prohibition contained in the
regulations. 42
Rule 704 allows admission of expert opinion regarding
any issue in a case, including the ultimate issue.'4 This
provision removes any doubt as to the viability of the
common law proscription of opinion testimony concern-
ing the ultimate issue in a dispute.44 The way is clear for
investigator testimony as to the probable cause of an acci-
dent, at least from the standpoint of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
These statutory and regulatory changes seem clear on
their face, but they have not put an end to judicial inter-
pretation. Recent cases highlight areas still unresolved by
existing law.
IV. PROBLEMS HIGHLIGHTED BY RECENT CASE LAW
Zealous advocates instinctively seek to find a way
around rules detrimental to their interests. This desire,
142 See supra note 122 and accompanying text for the text of the regulation gov-
erning admissibility of accident reports.
143 FED. R. EvID. 704. The rule reads:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.
(b) [Section (b) pertains only to expert testimony concerning the
mental state or condition of defendants in criminal suits.]
id.
44 See FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee note. The note reads in part: "The
older cases often contained strictures against allowing witnesses to express opin-
ions upon ultimate issues, as a particular aspect of the rule against opinions. The
rule was unduly restrictive, difficult of application, and generally served only to
deprive the trier of fact of useful information." Id.
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combined with liberal judicial interpretation, quickly cast
new light on the regulations set forth in 1974.
A. Conflicts of Interest
In 1978, a potential problem with the use of NTSB re-
ports surfaced in Seymour v. United States.145  Seymour
sought a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of several
reports including an NTSB Factual Accident Report.1 46
The United States urged that section 1441(e) prohibited
admission of the report. 147 The court discussed the differ-
ence between factual and opinion evidence, but seemed to
base its decision on the fact that the plaintiff sought to use
the report prepared by the defendant against the defend-
ant.' 48 Through this reasoning, the Factual Accident Re-
port (and potentially the probable cause report) become
admissions by the government whenever a party sues the
United States for damages arising from an aircraft
accident.' 49
This decision raises the concern that the knowledge
that litigants may use the investigator's report against the
government, will influence government employed investi-
gators in their fact gathering. 50 The fact that investigat-
14 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,141 (W.D.Tex. 1978).
Id. at 17,142. The other reports sought included the Collateral Investiga-
tion of the United States Army, the Technical Report-U.S. Army Aircraft Acci-
dent, Ft. Hood Flying Club Records regarding the accident, and Records of the
Ft. Hood Flying Club regarding the pilot. The court found all the reports admis-
sible. Id.
w" Id. The court cited Frank discussed supra, at notes 77-84 and accompanying
text.
14 Seymour, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,142. The court concluded the opinion as
follows:
The N.T.S.B. statute may not prohibit the type of evidence sought to
be introduced here. The plaintiffs seek only the introduction of the
N.T.S.B. factual report, not the N.T.S.B. probable cause report.
Since the N.T.S.B. is an agency of the United States, the N.T.S.B.
factual report was prepared by employees of the defendant. Accord-
ingly, the N.T.S.B. factual aircraft accident report is admissible into
evidence.
Id.
14.. See Welch & Faulk, supra note 32, at 593. This scenario parallels Falk, dis-
cussed supra notes 92-96.
See Welch & Faulk, supra note 32, at 593.
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ing teams include employees of parties with an interest in
the accident, other than just the government, compounds
this problem. 51 Part 831.9 of the NTSB regulations pro-
vides that the field investigation team may include per-
sons involved in an accident through their employees,
activities, or products. 5 2 The NTSB presumes that indi-
viduals with knowledge of the people and equipment in-
volved in the accident can provide assistance to the lead
NTSB investigator.'5 However, plaintiffs will often seek
to introduce these reports against parties with employees
or equipment involved in the accident. The statute cre-
ates an inherent conflict of interest by allowing these in-
terested parties to participate in preparing the report.
Any influence over the fact finding exerted by these "as-
sistants" diminishes the objectivity of the Factual Acci-
dent Report.
B. What is "Factual"?
Under the definitions adopted by the NTSB, the dis-
tinction between fact and opinion forms the basis for ad-
missibility decisions.' 5 4 However this distinction is not
easy to make.
The decision in Murphy v. Colorado Aviation Inc. evi-
dences this problem.' 55 The trial court in Murphy ruled
for the plaintiff and Colorado Aviation appealed. 56 In
one of its points of error, Colorado Aviation urged that
the trial court incorrectly allowed a former NTSB investi-
gator to testify to the probable cause of the accident. 5 7
1-, See Miller, supra note 7, at 274-75.
152 49 C.F.R. § 831.9 (1986).
'5' Miller, supra note 7, at 275.
- See supra note 119 for the text of the definitions adopted by the NTSB.
15 588 P.2d 877 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
mo Ii at 879.
I57 ld. at 881. Former NTSB employees are also governed by the regulations
prohibiting probable cause testimony. 49 C.F.R. § 835.7 (1986). Section 835.7
reads: "It is not necessary to request [NTSB] approval for testimony of a former
(NTSB] employee. However, the scope of testimony of former [NTSB] employ-
ees is limited to the matters delineated in § 835.3, and use of reports as pre-
scribed by § 835.4."
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The investigator testified to the weather conditions, the
fact that the pilot knew of the conditions, the pilot rating
necessary to fly in the conditions present, the availability
of a safe alternative route for a pilot with the rating of the
pilot involved, and that the plane did not appear to mal-
function prior to impact.' 58 Even a layman would likely
conclude from the testimony that the pilot acted negli-
gently and that this negligence was the probable cause of
the accident. However, the appellate court allowed the
testimony, finding no violation of the NTSB regulations
governing testimony.' 59
The testimony found acceptable in Murphy is a perfect
example of how counsel can use expert testimony to make
quite clear to the jury the expert's opinion as to the prob-
able cause of the accident without exceeding the bounds
of "fact". 60 Combine this problem with the potential for
conflicts of interest among the investigators, and the op-
portunity for manipulation of reports becomes clear.
C. Opinions Contained in Factual Reports
In the typical case, expert testimony introduces the
complex information contained in an NTSB report.
Counsel can object to forbidden opinion testimony as the
I'm Murphy, 588 P.2d at 882. The court summarized the investigator's
testimony:
He explained navigational aids, the factual circumstances surround-
ing the accident, the difference between visual (VFR) and instrument
flight ratings (IFR), interpreted weather documents, indicated that
weather information had been transmitted to the pilot from the Roa-
noke airport, stated that there was no evidence of any pre-impact
malfunction of the aircraft, opined that only an IFR pilot should fly
in clouds, that there was a safe alternate route for VFR pilots, and
that under prevailing weather conditions in the area at the time of
the crash, only an IFR pilot could have been flying properly at the
altitude at which the crash occurred. His testimony, however, while
leading to such a conclusion, did not state that this accident was
caused by the negligence of the pilot.
Id.
'." See supra note 122 for the text of the NTSB regulation.
i, See Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 158 Cal.
App. 3d 83, 92, 204 Gal. Rptr. 358, 362 (1984) for another example of using
expert testimony to make clear the probable cause of an accident.
(53
expert testifies. When litigants introduce entire NTSB re-
ports into evidence, the court can only excise objectiona-
ble opinion content after thoroughly examining the
document for prohibited statements. 6  Benna v. Reeder
Flying Service, Inc., while probably insignificant in its own
right, raises the importance of this issue. 62
In Benna, the parties introduced many large items of ev-
idence during the trial, so the judge allowed the jury to
deliberate in the courtroom instead of removing the evi-
dence to the jury room. 6 3 The judge inadvertently left
some unadmitted evidence on his bench, including the
Factual Accident Report and the NTSB probable cause re-
port.' " The court found that the jury did not view the
probable cause report and found the Factual Accident Re-
port merely cumulative of other evidence offered.' 6 5
Therefore, the court found no error and let the jury ver-
dict stand.
Given the difficulty in distinguishing fact from opinion
as to probable cause,16 6 admitting the entire Factual Acci-
dent Report raises two significant questions: first, whether
all NTSB reports necessarily contain or, at least, imply
'at See 49 C.F.R. § 835.3 (1986) (FAA states that opinion is intertwined in all
accident reports).
161 578 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1978). The decedents of the copilot and several pas-
sengers of a twin-engine DC-3 airplane filed this wrongful death action. Id. The
plane, which crashed and burned shortly after take-off from McGrath, Alaska, car-
ried.Bureau of Land Management forest firefighters. Id. at 270. The plane lost a
propeller during take-off and crashed into some trees about a mile from the run-
way. Id
The parties proposed two possible causes for the crash. Id at 270-71. The
defendant proposed that the pilot retracted the running gear prematurely causing
the propeller on one side of the plane to strike the ground. Id. The plaintiff
claimed that defendant negligently repaired the engine during a major overhaul
conducted three months and 130 hours of operation earlier. Id. at 271; see also
Welch & Falk, supra note 32, at 592 for a discussion of Benna.
- Benna, 578 F.2d at 271. Due to the claim of negligent engine repair, the
courtroom contained numerous large engine and propeller parts. Id
-, Id.
- Id. at 272. The plaintiff's counsel suggested that the court determine
whether anyone had viewed the probable cause report by holding the report up
from a distance and asking the jurors if any of them had looked at it. Id.
"' See supra notes 154-159 and accompanying text for a discussion of fact versus
opinion.
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forbidden opinions, and second whether ajudge can actu-
ally excise opinions from an accident report. The scope
and direction of the investigation itself may clearly indi-
cate the investigator's opinion as to the cause of the acci-
dent.1 67 Admitting unexcised (and possibly even excised)
Factual Accident Reports seemingly violates the intent, if
not the letter of the prohibition on opinion testimony.
D. "Is" v. "Isn't" Testimony
In many aircraft accident cases, a limited number of
truly possible causes exist.168 Sometimes the cause can be
determined only by ruling out other possibilities. Coun-
sel used this approach to get at probable cause testimony
in Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison.' 69
In Keen, the plaintiff contended that a defect in the
plane's engine caused the crash. 70 The defendant, who
had manufactured the engine, claimed that pilot incapac-
ity caused the crash.' 7' As part of its defense, the defend-
ant called an investigator from the NTSB as a witness. 72
The investigator testified "that the aircraft was function-
ing normally at high power at the time it stuck [sic] the
ground.' ' 7 3 The court found no error in admitting the
testimony, because it did not go to the proximate cause of
167 See Sweet v. Schenk, 792 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1986) ("the government essen-
tially argues that the expert opinions of NTSB investigators are dependent upon,
and somewhat reflected within, the opinions expressed by individuals that the in-
vestigator interviews during an investigation").
- See supra note 162 and accompanying text for an example of an accident with
limited possible causes.
"- 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Welch & Faulk, supra note 32, at 591
for a discussion of Keen.
17o Keen, 569 F.2d at 548. Keen piloted a jet for the FAA and died when the
plane he was piloting crashed during a test flight. Id. Keen's wife claimed that
defects in the turbine shaft and wheel assembly of the plane's engine caused the
crash. Id.
1' Id. Detroit Diesel introduced testimony that Keen was being treated for high
blood pressure. Id at 549. An FAA certification doctor testified that he would





Assuming that the engine manufacturer introduced all
possible causes for the accident so as to create doubt that
the engine malfunctioned, the only other possible cause
in this case was pilot incapacity. By having the NTSB in-
vestigator rule out engine malfunction as the cause, de-
fense counsel achieved the same result as if the
investigator had testified that pilot incapacity caused the
crash. Defense counsel effectively obtained investigator
testimony as to the probable cause without violating sec-
tion 1441 or the NTSB regulations.
E. NTSB Opinion Obtained From Non-NTSB Experts
The NTSB regulations allow investigators to rely on
Factual Accident Reports in preparing to testify.'77 The
regulations prohibit relying on, or testifying about, the
probable cause report. 76 However, the restrictions on
opinion testimony do not and cannot govern experts who
are not currently NTSB investigators. Advocates have
used this potential loophole in several cases.
One such case is Travelers Insurance Co. v. Riggs.'7 7 Trav-
elers first sought to introduce the entire NTSB report, but
the court would not admit any conclusions contained in
the report. 78 Travelers then objected when the court al-
lowed the defendant's expert to offer her opinions as to
the cause of the crash after viewing the entire NTSB re-
port. The court of appeals found no error in allowing the
1'4 l at 551. Interestingly, the court relied on the NTSB regulations in finding
the testimony admissible:
In our view an absolute prohibition of testimony from agency per-
sonnel could and perhaps would in many cases involving circum-
stances such as those in the case at bar be not only detrimental to a
private citizen proceeding as a plaintiff seeking the true facts trigger-
ing such a disaster but also in direct conflict with the Department of
Transportation guidelines for NTSB investigators....
17' See supra note 122 and accompanying text for the language of the regulation
governing investigators.
177 671 F.2d 810 (4th Cir. 1982).
17a Id at 816.
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testimony because the expert properly based the testi-
mony on facts within the NTSB report.179
A similar series of events occurred in Curry v. Chevron,
U.S.A.' 8 0 In Curry, plaintiff's counsel tried to have their
expert testify that he had relied on the NTSB probable
cause report, contending that Federal Rule of Evidence
703 permits such use.18' The court upheld the trial court
in allowing the expert to use the report, but forbid him
from relying on the report's opinions and conclusions. 8 2
The same situation existed in Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft
Corp.'" The defendant in the case contended that the
court erred because the trial court allowed the plaintiff's
expert to base his opinion on the contents of NTSB re-
ports. 8 4 The court found no error because the expert
had properly relied on only the factual content of the
reports.18 5
In Monger v. Cessna Aircraft Co., a court allowed an actual
participant in the NTSB investigation to testify as to the
probable cause of an accident.'8 6 The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit had no difficulty with the trial court
allowing the defendant to offer testimony of a representa-
tive of an engine manufacturer that "worked closely with
the NTSB in its investigation."' 1 7 The court stated that
the testimony would be barred if the NTSB employed the
witness as an investigator, but because they didn't, the
regulations did not apply. 188
These holdings result in a total annulment of section
179 Id. at 816-17.
,o 779 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1985).
is, Id. at 274.
IN2 Id.
797 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 846.
Id. The opinion does not indicate whether the expert used the Factual Acci-
dent Report, the probable cause findings, or both. The court did not find it nec-
essary to differentiate. Id. at 848.
Monger v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 812 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 408.
I" Id. The regulation referred to by the court is 49 C.F.R. § 835.3 (1986).
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1441(e) and the NTSB regulations.'8 9 The court in Mul-
Ian indirectly identified the problem when it refused to ex-
clude testimony from the expert just because the expert
and the NTSB, according to the probable cause report,
came to the identical conclusions as to the cause of the
accident. 90 The expert had used the NTSB report as the
basis for his opinion.1 91 Thus, to effectively use a benefi-
cial NTSB report at trial a litigant need only find an ex-
pert that will read the NTSB reports, then testify to the
same opinion as contained in the report.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Over the years several commentators have made recom-
mendations concerning the use of NTSB reports in civil
litigation. 92 These individuals have many years experi-
ence in this area, often including firsthand knowledge of
the workings of the NTSB. Thus, the recommendations
below will not appear altogether new. However, given the
absurdity of the current situation,193 continued pleas for
either legislative action, regulatory action, or both, are
critical.
In 1934, when Congress enacted the first ban on use of
accident reports, courts undoubtedly viewed air travel as
an ultrahazardous activity. Since 1934, the language of
the statute has remained unchanged, 194 while air travel
has become a commonplace aspect of daily life. Yet, the
modem court opinions contain no new reasons for the ev-
- See Loftleidir Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 158 Cal.
App. 3d 83, 95-97, 204 Cal. Rptr. 358, 364-66 (1984) (court of appeals reversed
because trial court excluded testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, who was a
former NTSB investigator and had signed the probable cause report).
o Mullan, 797 F.2d at 845. The court said, "To hold, as Quickie's argument
suggests, that (the expert] impermissibly relied on the NTSB report because his
conclusions were the same as or similar to those of the NTSB investigators, is an
inference which we shall not make." Id. at 848.
11 Id.
'UP See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 291-93; Welch & Faulk, supra note 32, at 600-
02.
"' See supra notes 145-191 and accompanying text for a review of recent cases
concerning admissibility of accident reports.
-'i See supra notes 10, 27, & 113.
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identiary ban. The 1951 decision in Universal Airline still
contains the best synopsis of the reasons for the policy.' 95
The court in Universal Airline first identified the congres-
sional mandate to the NTSB (then the CAB): investigate
current accidents so as to prevent future accidents.1 9
This mandate gives the NTSB the clear goal of preventing
accidents. This same goal forms the basis of our tort sys-
tem: apportion the cost of accidents to the responsible
parties so as to promote safety. Seemingly, the courts and
the NTSB could both better achieve the goal by cooperat-
ing. Instead, a wall exists in the form of section 1441(e)
that forces the two to strive for the goal separately.
The Universal Airline opinion lists the second reason for
section 1441(e) as the belief that witnesses would not dis-
close facts completely and honestly without a guarantee of
confidentiality.1 97 Originally, only the CAB had access to
accident reports. 98 They used the reports strictly to fur-
ther aviation safety through rule changes. 99 Now, liti-
gants have ready access to the reports. A witness, intent
on hiding facts, can not rely on section 1441(e) to main-
tain confidentiality. Furthermore, a negligent pilot will
not admit liability to an NTSB investigator, only to have
the statement used by the FAA in a certificate action. This
reason for the statute no longer fits with reality.
The CAB also justified the statute on the grounds that
one investigator might reach a conclusion different from
the agency's ultimate finding.200 Any disagreement as to
the cause of an accident apparent from the reports or
from investigator testimony impacts on the weight a jury
should give the evidence, not the admissibility of the evi-
dence. Certainly, in any contested air crash case, oppos-
ing experts will suggest many conflicting probable causes
for the accident. The NTSB has no reason to concern it-
,-5 See supra note 40 for the court's statement of the CAB's reasons.
l,, Id.
17 Id.
"1- See Welch & Faulk, supra note 32, at 585.
"'' Id.
See supra note 40 for the court's statement of the CAB's reasons.
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self with presenting only one unified opinion about an
accident.
Universal Airline cites the fourth reason as the concern
that investigators might influence the outcome of civil liti-
gation.20 1 At the time the CAB gave this reason, only
CAB investigators took part in the investigation. Today,
representatives of each entity with employees or products
involved in the crash take part in the investigation. 202 The
NTSB investigators do not operate in a vacuum. The
non-NTSB representatives on the investigation team look
out for their own interest. Furthermore, modern technol-
ogy provides the opportunity for testing not even
imagined when Congress passed the first air commerce
legislation. Many times this testing requires moving and
even destroying the item tested, making it impossible for
private investigators to follow-up. Courts recognize this
predicament and sometimes allow investigator testimony
when no other source of information exists.203 In this sit-
uation, the report of investigators should influence the out-
come of civil litigation.
The CAB, as expressed in Universal Airline, finally cites
money as a reason for limiting the use of accident re-
ports. 4 In expressing probably its most honest reason,
the CAB expresses its worst reason. Again, the NTSB and
the tort system share the same goals. The NTSB should
not attempt to hide behind budgetary constraints when
litigants come calling. The NTSB should require litigants
to compensate investigators called to trial, just as the par-
ties compensate any other expert. This situation does not
support limiting the admissibility of the probable cause
report.
Two other reasons for maintaining section 1441(e) float
through the cases and commentary. First, introducing the
NTSB's finding as to probable cause supplants the role of
201 JJ
20- See supra note 152 and accompanying text for a discussion of this provision.
-3 See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text for an example.
2' See supra note 40 for the court's statement of the CAB's reasons.
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the judge and jury.20 5 This reason carried more weight
before Congress adopted Federal Rule of Evidence
704.20 Now, any expert can express an opinion as to the
ultimate issue in a case. Viewing the report as an expert,
the concern over supplanting the role of judge and jury
no longer carries any weight. Second, juries view a report
prepared by a governmental agency as more credible, just
because of the preparer. °7 The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence do support this reasoning. Rule 803(8) creates a
hearsay exception for government reports, but only if
they are factual. 20 8 However, litigants can readily chal-
lenge the credibility of NTSB reports through a battle of
the experts. In many major cases, litigants have their own
in house experts that took part in the NTSB investigation
and can challenge the findings from first hand knowl-
edge.209 In any case, the litigant can argue the report is
admissible under rule 803(24), the general hearsay
exception.21 0
The current confused state of the law mandates change.
The regulations allow litigants to admit into evidence the
Factual Accident Report even though the NTSB admits
that it contains opinion that a court cannot effectively ex-
cise.21 ' Potential litigants can influence the report
201, See Papadakis, supra note 32, at 521. The CAB may have considered this
justification in stating their fourth reason. See supra note 40.
-1 See supra notes 143-144 for a discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 704.
207 Beena, 578 F.2d at 272.
2-). See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8).
'-' See supra note 152 for a discussion of outside party involvement in
investigations.
211 FED. R. EVID. 803(24). The requirements under rule 803(24) are:
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can produce through rea-
sonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence.
Id. A plaintiff might readily argue that the probable cause report is more proba-
tive as to the cause of an accident than anything the plaintiff can reasonably pro-
duce through individual effort.
"-,, See 49 C.F.R. § 835.3 (1986).
through their involvement in the investigation, but oppos-
ing counsel can address this by attacking the credibility of
the report, emphasizing to the jury that they should not
give the report much weight. Courts allow investigators
to testify to all the reasons a plane did not crash, but the
investigator cannot say why it did. A court carefully ex-
amines the basis of an expert's testimony, because the
opinion must not come straight from the probable cause
report. Yet, the same court justifiably refuses to rule that
the expert used the improper source just because the ex-
pert and the report came to the same conclusion. A court
finds that the Factual Accident Report is an admission
against the government and thus not hearsay,21 2 while the
real admission is the probable cause report.
Rather than putting courts and litigants through the
games currently taking place in the courts, Congress
should drop all restrictions on use of NTSB findings. Let
the evidence in for whatever it is worth, and let the parties
battle over credibility. Section 1441(e) began with an
"uncertain purpose ' 21 and has definitely not found one
today. Allow courts to view the reports under modern ev-
identiary rules and not a suspect 1934 edict. Give taxpay-
ers their money's worth from the reports and allow the
NTSB and tort system to work in harmony.
CONCLUSION
The road from the first air commerce legislation to the
present includes many turns. The NTSB played no small
role in the phenomenal success that the airline industry
has enjoyed. Congress attempted to limit the role of the
NTSB to accident prevention only, but ingenious attor-
neys have used the courts to expand this role by present-
ing NTSB findings in civil litigation in various ways. The
complexities of aircraft accident investigation warrant this
increased role. Courts have added judicial gloss to a stat-
S.2 See FED. R. EViD. 801(d)(2).
21.1 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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ute extremely clear on its face. As more courts ignore the
current prohibition on the use of NTSB findings, plain-
tiff's attorneys will begin to forum shop as inequities de-
velop between jurisdictions. The time has come, once
again, for the Legislature to speak.
